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The future of retail payments: opportunities and challenges 
 
The way people pay is continuously changing, as a result of innovations in retail 
payments, improvements in efficiency and regulatory changes. This changing 
environment creates opportunities for some and challenges for others in the retail 
payments sector. The impact of these changes on the future of retail payments was 
the main theme of the biannual retail payments conference organised by the European 
Central Bank (ECB), this time in cooperation with the Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
(OeNB), on 12 and 13 May 2011 in Vienna. More than 200 high-level policymakers, 
financial sector representatives, academics and central bankers from Europe and other 
regions attended this conference, reflecting the topicality of and interest in the retail 
payments market.  
 
The aim of the conference was to better understand current developments in retail 
payment markets and to identify possible future trends, by bringing together 
policymaking, research activities and market practice. A number of key insights and 
conclusions emerged. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) project is recognised 
as being on the right track, even though some further work needs to be done in the 
areas of standardisation of card payments and migration towards SEPA instruments. 
The European Commission’s proposal for a regulation setting an end date for 
migration to SEPA credit transfers and SEPA direct debits is welcomed. For SEPA to 
be a success, it is essential that users are involved, in order to ensure acceptance of 
the SEPA instruments. Moreover, innovations in retail payments are taking place 
more rapidly than ever, and payment service providers and regulators need to adapt 
quickly to this changing business environment. 
 
We would like to thank all participants in the conference for the very interesting 
discussions. In particular, we would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions 
and insights provided by all speakers, discussants, session chairpersons and 
panellists, whose names can be found in the conference programme. Their main 
statements are highlighted in the ECB-OeNB official conference summary. Six 4
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papers related to the conference have been accepted for publication in this special 
series of the ECB Working Papers Series.  
 
Behind the scenes, a number of colleagues from the ECB and the OeNB contributed 
to both the organisation of the conference and the preparation of these conference 
proceedings. In alphabetical order, many thanks to Nicola Antesberger, Stefan 
Augustin, Michael Baumgartner, Christiane Burger, Stephanie Czák, Susanne 
Drusany, Henk Esselink, Susan Germain de Urday, Monika Hartmann, Monika 
Hempel, Wiktor Krzyzanowski, Thomas Lammer, Tobias Linzert, Alexander 
Mayrhofer, Hannes Nussdorfer, Simonetta Rosati, Daniela Russo, Wiebe Ruttenberg, 
Heiko Schmiedel, Doris Schneeberger, Francisco Tur Hartmann, Pirjo Väkevainen 
and Juan Zschiesche Sánchez. 
 
 
Gertrude  Tumpel-Gugerell       Wolfgang  Duchatczek 
Former member of the Executive Board       Vice Governor 
European Central Bank           Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
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Abstract
In Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs) the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires
that merchants charge the same ￿nal good price regardless of the means of payment
chosen by the customer. In this paper, we analyze a three-party model (consumers,
merchants, and proprietary EPNs) to assess the impact of a NSR on the electronic
payments system, in particular, on competition among EPNs, network pricing to
merchants and consumers, EPNs￿pro￿ts, and social welfare.
We show that imposing a NSR has a number of e⁄ects. First, it softens competition
among EPNs and rebalances the fee structure in favor of cardholders and to the
detriment of merchants. Second, we show that the NSR is a pro￿table strategy for
EPNs if and only if the network e⁄ect from merchants to cardholders is su¢ ciently
weak. Third, the NSR is socially (un)desirable if the network externalities from
merchants to cardholders are su¢ ciently weak (strong) and the merchants￿market
power in the goods market is su¢ ciently high (low). Our policy advice is that
regulators should decide on whether the NSR is appropriate on a market-by-market
basis instead of imposing a uniform regulation for all markets.
Keywords: Electronic Payment System, Market Power, Network Externalities, No-
Surcharge Rule, Regulation, Two-sided Markets, MasterCard, Visa, American Express,
Discover.
JEL: L13, L42, L80.7
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be particularly relevant in the welfare analysis (section 5). When surcharging is allowed,
prices in the goods market may di⁄er according to the EPN employed to complete the
payment, i.e., p1 may di⁄er from p2.
We use a set of general assumptions regarding the end-users demands (assumption 1
on consumers and assumption 2 on merchants below) and the equilibrium price in the
goods market (reduced form solution in Lemma 1 below). The detailed description of the
di⁄erent agents and price determination in the goods market follows.
Consumers. Formally, consumers, (superscript c hereafter) demand function for EPN

















, i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j, (4)
where S is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if surcharge is allowed or 0 under the NSR
and, 0 < ￿ < 1 measures to what extent EPNs 1, 2 are substitute payment instruments
from the consumers￿standpoint. Equation (4) satis￿es assumption 1 below.
Assumption 1 (Consumers demand): Consumers demand for EPN i￿ s services in (4) is
a twice di⁄erentiable function decreasing in Nfi and Npi, and increasing in NDm
i , where
Nfi ￿ fi ￿ ￿fj,








Intuitively, assumption 1 means that when choosing an EPN, consumers compare
the fee and price of purchasing goods using EPN i, fi and pi, against similar values of
purchasing using EPN j, fj and pj.12 According to (i) and (ii) in (2) consumers demand
for EPN i should decrease in Nfi and Npi since Uh
i ￿ Uh
j is harder to satisfy. For any
￿xed (fj;pj), Uh
i ￿ 0 is harder to satisfy as fi or pi increase. If ￿ increases, the degree of
substitution between EPNs from the consumers￿perspective will be higher (see Singh and
Vives (1984)). Similar rationale applies to the goods price when S = 1, and to merchant
acceptance coverage variations.
Cardholders take into account the cross-group externality captured by NDm
i , that is,
they care about the extent of merchant acceptance o⁄ered by each network. The larger
the merchant acceptance by EPN i relatively to network j, the larger will be the demand
12Under the NSR, Npi = 0, consumers only equate membership fees and the number of merchants
accepting each EPN in their payment instrument decisions.15
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for payment services of network i, ceteris paribus, since Uh
i ￿ Uh
j and Uh
i ￿ 0 are then
easier to satisfy given the de￿nition of consumers utility in (1).13
The goods market equilibrium. For simplicity we treat the equilibrium prices in the
goods market as a reduced form solution (p￿
0;p￿
1;p￿
2). When surcharging is allowed, the
prices are given by
p
￿
0 = ￿v, (5)
p
￿
1 = ￿v + (1 ￿ ￿)(m1 ￿ b), (6)
p
￿
2 = ￿v + (1 ￿ ￿)(m2 ￿ b), (7)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] denotes merchant market power in the goods market.14 When the NSR is
imposed, the goods market price is the same regardless of the payment instrument chosen
by the consumer, i.e., pNSR
0 = pNSR
i = ￿p￿
0 +(1 ￿ ￿)p￿
i = ￿v +(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(mi ￿ b) in
the symmetric equilibrium, ￿ 2 [0;1].15
The assumed reduced form solutions (5) to (7) are general in the sense that they can
mimic, with an appropriate ￿, the price equilibria of standard Micro and IO models of ￿rm
competition. For example, if ￿ = 0, then (p￿
0;p￿
1;p￿
2) = (0;m1 ￿ b;m2 ￿ b), corresponding
to the perfectly competitive market outcome in which prices equal the net marginal costs.
If ￿ = 1, then (p￿
0;p￿
1;p￿
2) = (v;v;v) merchants have maximum market power and set prices
equal to consumer￿ s maximum willingness-to-pay. In the case of duopolistic competition
￿ la Hotelling, prices correspond to the sum of the net marginal cost, mi ￿ b, plus a
transportation cost t. The analog to our reduced form pricing can be re-written as pi =
￿ (v ￿ (mi ￿ b)) + mi ￿ b, ￿ set equal to ￿ = t
v￿(mi￿b). In the Cournot oligopoly with N
￿rms, constant marginal costs mi ￿ b, and linear demand P = v ￿ bQ, the equilibrium
price is P ￿ = 1
N+1v + N
N+1 (mi ￿ b), which corresponds to setting ￿ = 1
N+1 in the reduced
form solution. Lemma 1 generalizes the application of the reduced form solution in the
goods market equilibrium.
13If both EPNs increase their membership fees by one dollar, the total impact in the number of
































i=@fi < 0 by assumption 1 and 0 < ￿ < 1.
14This is equivalent to saying that p￿
1 and p￿
2 are bounded, p￿
i 2 [mi ￿ b;v], i = 1;2. We assume that
merchants do not face costs for setting multiple prices for the same product, i.e., there is no cost of
surcharging.
15We assume that under the NSR the equilibrium price falls between p￿
0 and p￿
i. This re￿ ects either
the NSR, or even when merchants are allowed to surcharge, that they choose to not do so. Empirically
we ￿nd that merchants do not usually set di⁄erential prices depending on the payment mean. Frankel
(1998) calls this phenomenon price coherence.16
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Lemma 1 (Goods Market Reduced Form Solution): Consider market k characterized
by (i) constant net marginal cost k of providing the good, (ii) consumer willingness-to-
pay v, and (iii) v > k. For any level of competition among ￿rms in the market there
exists a unique ￿ 2 [0;1] such that the equilibrium price p￿
k can be written as pk (￿) =
￿v + (1 ￿ ￿)k.
Proof: All proofs are in an appendix.
Merchants. Given the merchant fees (m1;m2) and goods market prices (p0;p1;p2), mer-
chants choose whether to request access either to EPN 1 or 2, multi-home by accepting
both EPNs or accept cash only. Formally, merchants (superscript m hereafter) demand
function for EPN i services corresponds to the mass of merchants that satis￿es the non-




i (mi) ￿ Pr(b ￿ mi ￿ (pi ￿ p0)), i = 1;2 (8)




. Equation (8) satis￿es assumption 2
below.
Assumption 2 (Merchants demand): Merchants demand for EPN i￿ s services is a twice
di⁄erentiable function such that Dm
i (mi)
0 < 0.




0 , condition (8) becomes Pr(b ￿ m￿
ijNSR). Under surcharging p￿
i ￿
p￿
0 = (1 ￿ ￿)(m￿
i ￿ b). Therefore, Pr(b ￿ m￿
i ￿ (p￿
i ￿ p￿
0)) = Pr(b ￿ m￿
i ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(m￿
i ￿ b)) =
Pr(b ￿ m￿
i), which is identical to the condition that de￿nes merchants demand under the
NSR. Hence, the merchants demand functional form is the same regardless of whether
the NSR is imposed or not. Murphy and Ott (1977) suggest that cash customers impose
more costs than card users on merchants￿pro￿ts. In fact, currently there are businesses
that are no longer accepting cash.16 Our model follows this suggestion by normalizing to
zero the merchant cost of a cash transaction and de￿ning mi ￿b ￿ 0 as the cost of doing
the same transaction electronically. ￿
Despite the fact that merchant demand functions are independent of the number of
cardholders in each network, we still have cross-group network e⁄ects because the surplus
of a merchant depends on the number of cardholders as de￿ned in (3). In this aspect,
our approach is similar to R&T (2003), where the total surplus of a merchant accepting
EPN i, with gross per transaction surplus b is (b ￿ mi)Dc
i depends on the number of
cardholders Dc
i.17
16New York Restaurant Loses Its Appetite for Cash, The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2009;
Plastic only: Cafe refuses to accept cash, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, October 11, 2006.
17However, R&T (2003) assumed that the No-Surcharge Rule is always imposed.17
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Platforms. EPN i chooses simultaneously and non-cooperatively the end-user fees, fi
per cardholder and mi per transaction. Without loss of generality, assume that platforms
have costs normalized to zero or alternatively interpret fi and mi as price-to-cost margins.
Each merchant completes one transaction with each one of the cardholders, resulting in a
total number of transactions processed by EPN i of Dm
i Dc





























i (mi) from (8)
A summary of the model￿ s notation is shown in table 1.
Table 1 - Notation Summary
pi price of a unit of a good with payment processed under EPN i
p0 price of a unit of a good when cash is used for payment
fi cardholder membership (annual) fee at EPN i
mi merchant fee per transaction processed under EPN i
Dc
i number of cardholders on EPN i
Dm
i number (mass) of merchants on EPN i
S indicator variable taking value 1 if surcharge is allowed, 0 otherwise
v consumer￿ s willingness-to-pay for a unit of a good
￿ substitution degree among EPNs
b merchant bene￿t of a cashless transaction relatively to cash
￿ b highest value of b
￿ merchant market power in the goods market
3 The Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium concept used is the Nash equilibrium de￿ned below, where
(f;m) ￿ (f1;f2;m1;m2).
De￿nition (Market Equilibrium): A market equilibrium is a pair of pairs (f￿
i ;m￿
i), i =




￿i, de￿ned in (9), subject to end-user demands
(Dc
i (f;m);Dm
i (mi)), (4) and (8), taking as given the fee choices (fj;mj)j6=i of EPN j.18
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A main goal of the paper is to understand the impact of the NSR on platforms com-
petition, pricing structure, and pro￿ts. The roadmap for this section is as follows. First
we derive a series of results with elasticities characterizing the platforms optimal pricing
conditions. Then, we verify the NSR￿ s impact on those elasticities. Our results show
that (i) the EPNs￿pro￿t maximization problem consists of two parts: setting the average
total fee level per transaction, and setting the relative fees, (ii) under the NSR, consumers
demand for EPNs becomes less elastic with respect to merchant fees, and (iii) under the
NSR, the total fee is higher.
Second, once the optimal fee mechanism for networks is disassembled, we derive the
market equilibrium pricing and pro￿ts. We compare market equilibrium fees and pro￿ts
under surcharging versus under the NSR. We show that the NSR (i) rebalances the pricing
structure in favor of cardholders, and (ii) increases platforms￿pro￿ts if and only if the
network externality exerted by merchants over cardholders is su¢ ciently weak.
3.1 The Elasticity Rule
3.1.1 The platforms￿optimal private solution
Lemma 2 shows the rule that pro￿t maximizing platforms follow when choosing the
pricing structure.
Lemma 2 (Platforms￿Optimal Private Solution): Pro￿t maximizing platforms set fees
according to the following rule,



































This result is reminiscent of a ￿nding by R&T (2003), in the sense that it shows that
the network￿ s maximization problem of choosing the optimal fees can be decomposed in










"m + "c;m. (11)
The novelty on this result is the introduction of the e⁄ect of a variation in network
size. The term "c;m in the EPN optimal pricing rule arises because the cardholders are
sensitive to the number of merchants in each EPN and to their fees, as these are re￿ ected19
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in the ￿nal goods prices. In R&T (2003) such interaction does not exist and therefore
"c;m = 0.
3.1.2 Elasticity decomposition and the NSR impact
The introduction of the cross elasticity term "c;m measures consumers demand varia-
tion with respect to changes in merchant fees. Therefore, the cross elasticity term plays
an important role since it captures, among other e⁄ects, how consumers change their
demand for network services in the presence of the NSR. To investigate the NSR impact
on consumers￿demand, it is convenient to decompose the cross elasticity "c;m in order
to separate the NSR (pricing) e⁄ect from the remaining e⁄ects. Lemma 3 presents this
decomposition.
Lemma 3 (Elasticity decomposition): The pro￿t-maximizing rule (10) can be re-written
as




"m (1 + "Dc;Dm) + "Dc;Np"Np;m,











































where "y;x refers to the percentage impact on y of 1% change in variable x. From (12)
we observe that the impact of merchant fees on cardholders demand for EPNs can be
decomposed in two e⁄ects.
(i) The goods market price e⁄ect, "Dc;Np"Np;m, due to merchant fee di⁄erences that
enhance goods market price di⁄erences when EPN-based prices are allowed. Note that the
NSR in￿ uences the cross elasticity "c;m through the goods market price e⁄ect. Speci￿cally,
when the NSR is binding, from the consumers￿standpoint the goods market price does
not vary irrespective of the EPN chosen to process payments. In our model, the NSR is
equivalent to imposing S = 0 =) Npi = 0 which by its turn implies "Dc;Np"Np;m = 0.18
(ii) The cross-group externality e⁄ect, "Dc;Dm"m, is due to the assumption that card-
holders prefer EPNs with larger merchant acceptance. Since the number of merchants













since @ (Npi)=@mi = 0 due to the fact that Npi = 0 as a result of the NSR.20
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in each EPN is in￿ uenced by merchant fees, cardholders behavior will also be indirectly
in￿ uenced by those fees.
Given the elasticity decomposition shown in Lemma 3, the following result regarding
the NSR arises.
Proposition 1 (No-Surcharge Rule impact): Relatively to the market equilibrium without
restrictions, under the NSR regime, entailing Npi = 0, (i) the cross elasticity of consumers
demand to merchant fees becomes less elastic and, (ii) EPNs increase the average total
fee level per transaction.
3.2 Pricing Structure and Pro￿ts at the Market Equilibrium
This section presents and compares the market equilibrium pricing structure and prof-
its under surcharging and under the NSR. We show ￿rst that the NSR biases the pricing
structure in favor of cardholders. Second, we show that the NSR will increase platforms￿
pro￿ts if and only if the network externality exerted by merchants over cardholders is
su¢ ciently weak.
3.2.1 Market equilibrium under surcharging










































i =@fi = 0 since Dm















as a matter of terminology simpli￿cation.
The optimality conditions can be re-written as
8
> > > <
































To guarantee that the pricing solution from system (13) is indeed a maximizer of
platform￿ s pro￿t we introduce assumption 3.21
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Proposition 3 (Changes in pricing structure under the NSR): Relatively to the market
equilibrium with surcharging, the EPN pricing structure under the NSR decreases card-
holder membership fees and increases merchant per transaction charges.22
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fee di⁄erences cannot be re￿ ected in purchase price di⁄erences. Since, under the NSR,
consumers are less responsive to merchant fees, EPNs charge higher fees to merchants.
However, higher merchant fees will cause the mass of merchants accepting electronic
payments to decline. This in turn reduces cardholder valuation of the EPN. Thus, in
accordance with the EPN￿ s best-response function, membership fees should be lower,
otherwise the EPNs would lose cardholders and pro￿ts would decline.
We now study the NSR pro￿tability, that is, the conditions under which the NSR
results in an increase of EPNs￿pro￿ts. Proposition 4 below shows that the NSR will be a











dmi , is weak enough.20
The intuition for the result is as follows. Suppose that merchants exert a large positive
externality, that is, consumers are willing to pay a much higher membership fee if EPN
i has a larger merchant acceptance. Hence, if EPNs implement the NSR, by Proposition
3, merchant per transaction charges will increase, and by Assumption 2 the number of
merchants on the network will decrease. But then cardholders demand will su⁄er a sharp
cutback that could only be compensated by a su¢ ciently large discount on the membership
fee. However, such a large discount would be unpro￿table for EPNs.
Also note that if consumers demand strongly varies with fi, that is, if consumers are
strongly responsive to membership fees, then the NSR will be a pro￿table strategy since,
by Proposition 3, it induces a membership fee reduction and thus invigorates cardholder
demand. Proposition 4 presents the formal condition that assures pro￿tability of the
NSR for an EPN. As corollary, if the pro￿tability condition holds for one ￿rm, then,
under symmetry, it will hold for both.
Proposition 4 (The NSR pro￿tability): The NSR is a pro￿table strategy for an EPN
















Corollary to Proposition 4: Under symmetry of end-user demands, if the NSR is a
pro￿table strategy for an EPN, then it will be a dominant strategy for both EPNs.
For the rest of the exposition, we assume that if the NSR is implemented by an EPN
it is pro￿table, and condition @Dc
i=@mi > Dm
i :@Dc
i=@fi in Proposition 4 holds.
4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we ￿rst check the NSR impact on the number of end-users in the
electronic payment system and on the goods market price. We show that the NSR reduces
20Note that @Dc
i=@mi measures cardholder demand variation to merchant fee. Therefore, the larger
the derivative (in absolute value), the larger will be the cross-group externality that merchants exert.23
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the number of merchants accepting card payments, increases the number of cardholders,
and raises the equilibrium goods market price paid by cardholders.
We then investigate the surplus variations that the NSR implies on each group of
agents. We also discuss the total welfare variation and show conditions under which soci-
ety is better o⁄under the NSR equilibrium. We highlight that (i) merchant market power,
￿, in the goods market and (ii) the network externality from merchants to cardholders
are two relevant determinants of whether the NSR is socially desirable.
According to Proposition 3, merchants per transaction charges are higher under the
NSR. Therefore, by assumption 2, the number of merchants accepting payment cards
will unambiguously decrease. Regarding cardholders, the analysis is more complex in the
sense that we ￿nd two opposite e⁄ects on cardholders demand: the decrease on cardholder
fee and the increase on merchant fees that diminishes the number of merchants accepting
cards. However, assuming that the network e⁄ects exerted by merchants over cardholders
are su¢ ciently weak (condition from Proposition 4), the former e⁄ect dominates the latter
and the NSR net e⁄ect on cardholders demand will be positive.
The e⁄ect on the goods market price paid by cardholders is straightforward by Lemma
1. Since merchants per transaction charges are part of their marginal cost, the equilibrium
price paid by cardholders increases. Proposition 5 formalizes these intuitions.21
Proposition 5 (NSR impact on the number of end-users and goods market price): Rela-
tively to the surcharging case, the NSR leads to (i) a reduction on the number of merchants
accepting card payments, (ii) an increase on the number of cardholders￿and (iii) an in-
crease on the equilibrium goods market price paid by cardholders.
Remark 2. Despite the fact that cardholder fees are lower under the NSR, cardholders
face additional expenditure related with the price adjustment in the goods market due
to the merchant fees increase. Note that, as merchants market power increases, the price
increase in the goods market, due to the NSR, is smaller. In the limit, if the goods
market has a monopolistic structure ￿ = 1, then ￿pi = 0. When merchant market power
in the goods market is high, prices follow closely consumer willingness-to-pay. In other
words, merchants do not pass-through the marginal cost of card usage to cardholders. If
merchant market power is high (￿ ’ 1) and the NSR is introduced, then cardholders will
keep paying (approximately) the same price in the goods market but membership fees
will be lower. Proposition 6 below shows the merchants￿market power relevance for the
goods market as one determinant of the NSR social desirability. ￿
We discuss the variations on merchant and cardholder payment surpluses due to the
21The e⁄ect of the NSR on the number of transactions on platform i, Dm
i Dc
i, is unclear. As we have
seen from Proposition 5 the number of merchants decreases but there is an increase on the number of
cardholders. Therefore, is not clear which will be the dominant e⁄ect.24
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i (xi)dxi is the merchant surplus per transaction and
Dc
i is the number of transactions that each merchant will process through EPN i.






















We highlight that cardholder surplus decreases with expenditure fi and pi (mi), since
marginal cardholders will stop using the EPN when total expenditure increases and those
who remain at the EPN will see their individual surplus to decrease. Additionally, the
derivative with respect to the number of merchants captures two e⁄ects: the change on the
number of transactions under EPN i and, the impact on cardholders willingness-to-pay
for i￿ s payment card.
Lemma 4.1 summarizes the value functions variations, introduced by the NSR, on
both agent types. Lemma 4.2 shows the expression for social surplus variation.















i ) denote cardholders￿total surplus at EPN i,
then the approximated variation, due to the NSR,
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i as derived and inter-












dmi > 0, the









































which is undetermined without further assumptions.
Given @Dc



























The previous expression depends on the merchant market power ￿. Hence, if ￿ is
su¢ ciently high such that (14) is negative, consumers will bene￿t from the NSR.22 The
reason why cardholder surplus variation (due to the NSR) depends positively on merchant
market power is similar to that of Remark 2.
Finally, social surplus variation is as follows.23

























































































hence, for ￿ = 1, expression in (14) is negative.
23Recall that, by assumption, cash payments do not generate value to both payee and payor. Thus,
cash payments are discarded from the welfare analysis.26
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< 0 holding the condition from Proposition 4.























depending on merchants market power in the goods market. Proposition 6 shows under
what conditions the NSR is socially (un)desirable.
Proposition 6 (The NSR impact on total welfare): The NSR will be socially (un)desirable
if the network externality exerted by merchants on cardholders is su¢ ciently weak (strong)



































Proposition 6￿ s main message is that the network externality condition that assures
the NSR pro￿tability to EPNs may be insu¢ cient to guarantee a better social outcome. In
order to assure social desirability, the NSR has to be applied in markets whose merchants
have su¢ ciently high market power, i.e., de￿ne prices according to consumers willingness-
to-pay and do not fully pass-through the marginal cost of sales (including the card usage)
to cardholders (recall Remark 2). Hence, under the NSR, in a market whose merchants
have su¢ ciently high market power, cardholders do not pay much more for their purchases
while bene￿t from a discount on the membership fee. In these cases, the NSR acts as a
pricing distortion (see Proposition 3) that partially corrects the opposite price distortion
in the goods market due to merchants market power. Recalling the expression ￿ght ￿re
with ￿re, a way to combat a distortion is with another distortion.
On the other hand, if the market for goods is highly competitive, i.e., market price
is close to cost, then the NSR will implicitly generate distortions by in￿ ating merchant
costs when serving cardholders. In that case, the NSR will introduce a distortion in a
market which had no distortions, making society worse o⁄.27
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Therefore, although merchant market power is irrelevant to EPNs when deciding on
the implementation of the NSR, it is fundamental in determining the NSR desirability
from the social perspective. In fact, the higher the merchant market power ￿, the bigger
the likelihood of the NSR being socially desirable.24
The network e⁄ect exerted by merchants on cardholders also a⁄ects total surplus. If
the network e⁄ect is su¢ ciently strong, then the NSR will reduce cardholder surplus due
to the decrease in the number of merchants accepting card payments. Hence, the social
perspective suggests the existence of a relationship between merchants market power
￿ and network e⁄ect exerted by merchants on cardholders, @Dc
i=@mi. Proposition 7
presents the social indi⁄erence equation which is the set of allocations with coordinates
(￿;NE) 2 [0;1] ￿ R
+
0 where society is indi⁄erent to whether the NSR is implemented.
Let NE denote the network e⁄ect that the number of merchants accepting card payments
has on cardholders demand, i.e., ￿@Dc
i=@mi.
Proposition 7 (The Social Indi⁄erence Equation): The set of allocations with coordinates
(￿;NE) 2 [0;1] ￿ R
+
0 such that society is indi⁄erent to the NSR implementation, i.e.,




































where NE ￿ ￿@D
c
i=@mi.
Proposition 7 highlights the existence of a relationship between the network externality
that merchants exert on cardholders and merchant market power in the goods market.















> 0, hence even if the
NE is signi￿cant it might be the case that the NSR is socially desirable when the merchant
market power is su¢ ciently high.
From Proposition 4, we can write the EPN i￿ s indi⁄erence equation between imple-

















Therefore, at the point of indi⁄erence, an increase of NE (cross-group Network E⁄ects)
will make the NSR an unpro￿table strategy.
Figures 3 and 4 depict the set of points where the NSR is a pro￿table strategy for
EPN i (areas A and B) and compares it to the set of points where the NSR is socially
desirable (areas B and C).
24By introducing a cost of surcharging the merchant market power threshold, from which the NSR is
socially desirable, should decrease.28
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1388
October 2011
;9GD7  ">>GEFD3F;A@ A8 EA5;3> 3@6 )'OE ;@6;T7D7@57 >;@7E
,:7 '+* ;E 3 BDAMF34>7 EFD3F79K 3E >A@9 3E F:7 @7FIAD= 7T75F 8DA? ?7D5:3@FE A@
53D6:A>67DE ;E 47>AI F:7 F:D7E:A>6  .2).C*6*2(* 0.2*	D 7 9 3 D 6 > 7 E EA 8! A I 7 H 7 D 	8 D A ?
F:7 EA5;3> B7DEB75F;H7	 8AD >AI >7H7>E A8 	7 H 7 @; 8;E 47>AI F:7 )'OE ;@6;T7D7@57 5GDH7	
F:7 '+* ?;9:F @AF ;@5D73E7 EA5;3> I7>83D7 F:7 3D73  "@ 3D73  F:7D7 ;E 3 ?;E3>;9@?7@F
A8 EA5;3> 3@6 @7FIAD= ;@F7D7EFE (@ F:7 A@7 :3@6	 F:7 '+* ;@5D73E7E @7FIAD=EO BDAMFE	
4GF	 A@ F:7 AF:7D	 ;FE EA5;3> 5AEF BD;57 6;EFADF;A@E 6G7 FA F:7 ;@5D73E7 A@ ?7D5:3@F 877
D76G57E F:7 EA5;3> 47@7MF @3?7>K	 >AI7D 53D6:A>67D ?7?47DE:;B 877
E I7 D76A F:7 5AEF
47@7MF 3@3>KE;E 8AD :;9:7D >7H7>E A8 ?7D5:3@F ?3D=7F BAI7D ;@ F:7
9AA6E ?3D=7F	 .*	: ; 9 : 7 D =77B;@9 F:7  MJ76 3F EA?7 BAE;F;H7 >7H7> 3@6 47>AI F:7
)' ;@6;T7D7@57 5GDH7 F:7 EA5;3> 47@7MF 8DA? F:7 '+* ;@5D73E7E E;@57 ;F 5A@FD;4GF7E FA
5ADD75F ?3D=7F BAI7D 6;EFADF;A@E /7 97F F:7@ ;@FA 3D73  I : 7 D 74 A F :@ 7 F I A D =3 @ 6E A 5 ; 3 >
;@F7D7EFE 3D7 3>;9@76 ;@ 83HAD A8 F:7 '+* ;?B>7?7@F3F;A@
D73  5ADD7EBA@6E FA F:7 E;FG3F;A@ I:7@ F:7 '+* EA5;3> 47@7MF	 3?7@6;@9 F:7 :;9:
?7D5:3@F ?3D=7F BAI7D	 ;E EGS5;7@F>K :;9: F:3F 5A?B7@E3F7E F:7 EA5;3> 5AEF	 G@67D EFDA@9
@7FIAD= 7JF7D@3>;F;7E .*	 34AH7 F:7 )' ;@6;T7D7@57 >;@7 D73  ;E 5:3D35F7D;L76 4K
F:7 6;H7D97@57 A8 @7FIAD= 3@6 EA5;3> ;@F7D7EFE !7@57	 ;@ F:7 34E7@57 A8 D79G>3F;A@ AD
FD3@E87DE	 67EB;F7 F:7 835F F:3F F:7 '+* ;E EA5;3>>K 67E;D34>7	 )'E I;>> 5:AAE7 @AF FA
;?B>7?7@F ;F >F:AG9: 3D73  ?3K @AF 7J;EF	 3D73  I:7D7 @7FIAD= 3@6 EA5;3> ;@F7D7EFE
3D7 3>;9@76 A@ '+* ;?B>7?7@F3F;A@ I;>> @757EE3D;>K 7J;EF E77 F:7 BDAA8 A8 )DABAE;F;A@ 
+77 M9GD7  8AD 3@ ;>>GEFD3F;A@ I:7D7 3D73  6A7E @AF 7J;EF29
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1388
October 2011
;9GD7  ">>GEFD3F;A@ A8 EA5;3> ;@6;T7D7@57 >;@7 47>AI F:7 )'OE ;@6;T7D7@57 >;@7	 8AD 3>>
  
	
0-.-1(2(-,  <.78*2(* 3+ &003(&8.327 ;-*6* 8-*   .7 73(.&00= )*7.6&'0* &2) 463+
.8&'0* 36  




 79(- 8-&8 8-*   .7 7.1908&2*3970= 73(.&00= )*7.6&'0* &2) 463?8&'0*
+36 7
"@ F:7 8A>>AI;@9 E75F;A@ I7 6;E5GEE BAEE;4>7 BA>;5K ;@F7DH7@F;A@E F3=;@9 ;@FA 5A@E;67D

3F;A@ F:7 D7EG>FE BD7H;AGE>K 67D;H76
"@ F:;E E75F;A@	 I7 6;E5GEE BA>;5K 5A@E;67D3F;A@E 3@6 BAEE;4>7 ;@F7DH7@F;A@E ;@ F:7 B3K

?7@F 53D6 ;@6GEFDK I;F: D793D6 FA F:7 '+* /7 EF3DF 4K 5A@E;67D;@9 F:7 BDAE 3@6 5A@E
A8 &'30.7-.2, 8-*   H7DEGE 23 6*,90&836= .28*6:*28.32	 .*	 >7FF;@9 )'E 675;67 A@ F:7
'+* ;?B>7?7@F3F;A@ /7 5A@5>G67 F:3F A@7 BA>;5K )3*7 238 ?8 &00 ?3D=7FE "@ 97@7D3>	
F:7D7 3D7 E;9@;M53@F 6;T7D7@57E 8DA? ?3D=7F FA ?3D=7F /7 5>3;? F:3F D79G>3FADE E:AG>6
F3=7 ;@FA 355AG@F F:AE7 ?3D=7F EB75;M5;F;7E	 @3?7>K F:7 ?7D5:3@FE ?3D=7F BAI7D	 675;6;@9
34AGF F:7 '+* A@ 3 1&6/*8'=1&6/*8 43E;E ;@EF736 A8 G@;8AD?>K D79G>3F;@9 3>> ?3D=7FE
GD;@9 F:7 >3EF 675367 5AGDFE 3@6 BA>;5K?3=7DE :3H7 ;@H7EF;93F76 F:7 4GE;@7EE BD35

F;57E A8 B3K?7@F @7FIAD=E "@ ?AEF 5AG@FD;7E	 53D6 @7FIAD=E ;?BAE7 F:7 '+* BD7H7@F;@9
5 Policy Interventions: one size does not ￿t all
5.1 Eliminating restrictions on di⁄erential pricing
Proposition 8 shows that area B always exists. In other words, there exists a set of
allocations where the NSR is socially desirable and simultaneously pro￿table for EPNs.30
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merchants from setting di⁄erent prices across EPNs. However, abolishing restrictions on
di⁄erential pricing may be an attractive policy option for society as a whole. For example,
the Reserve Bank of Australia has decided to remove the NSR.
Some authors claim that abolishing the NSR would remove a restraint of trade.
Nonetheless, this economic justi￿cation is questionable. For instance, according to our
analysis (see footnote 20) it is unclear that the number of card transactions will increase
or decrease without the NSR. Proposition 5 shows that without the NSR on the one
hand the number of merchants accepting card payments will increase, but on the other
hand fewer consumers will use payment cards. Hence, the net e⁄ect on the number of
transactions is not clear a priori.
Here, we highlight some of the pros and cons of this policy. The NSR exclusion has the
advantage of being a transparent policy, easy to implement and enforce; it does not require
the regulator to have information about costs and bene￿ts of any of the agents involved in
a transaction. Its applicability and e⁄ect does not depend on the card type (debit, prepaid
or credit), the network organizational structure (three-party or four-party systems), or
its pricing strategy. Moreover, it may allow for goods market price changes so to re￿ ect
the real costs and bene￿ts of card transactions to merchants. Hence, consumers may
internalize the externalities tied to the use of payment cards, which would promote more
e¢ cient payment card use from the social perspective. However, this argument is valid
only as long as merchants￿behavior is su¢ ciently competitive (see Remark 2). In order
for di⁄erential pricing to correctly internalize externalities, these price di⁄erences must
accurately re￿ ect social costs and bene￿ts. If merchants have market power, they might
obstruct the NSR suppression policy from encouraging the e¢ cient utilization of card
payments by distorting prices and fees away from the social costs and bene￿ts. Another
disadvantage of this policy is that it may generate confusion and uncertainty among
consumers, if merchants set a di⁄erent price for each payment means. Also, merchants
would bear extra costs of setting and managing a system with several prices for each
product. In particular, we should expect increased (menu) costs to merchants of updating
price lists, pamphlets, and shelf prices.
5.2 Laissez faire, laissez aller, laissez passer
An alternative policy for antitrust authorities regarding the payment card system is
simply not to intervene. We discuss here some pros and cons of the laissez faire policy.
First, it is not clear ex-ante that the market outcome is less e¢ cient than what would
result with intervention. For example, in Proposition 8 we show that there exists a set
of allocations (area B) where EPNs choices regarding the NSR adoption are compatible
with the socially desirable choices. Nonetheless, while it is ambiguous that the market31
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outcome is ine¢ cient, it is also unclear that it is e¢ cient. For example, consider area A in
Figure 3. In that set, the NSR implementation is optimal from the network perspective
but undesirable from the social standpoint.
Second, policy interventions may generate unforeseen and unintended adverse conse-
quences for the payment card system. However, private or government legal actions based
on antitrust laws are important to provide e⁄ective means to deal with competition is-
sues on the payment card industry. Furthermore, litigation implies substantial costs and
without regulation it would signi￿cantly increase uncertainty with regard to the outcome
of possible negotiations or of a verdict in court. Regulatory indecision may also delay the
introduction of innovation in the electronic payment system.
Third, entry and innovation have occurred in the payment industry (e.g. PayPal)
re￿ ecting the free market performance to tackle merchant concerns about high merchant
fees for payment card transactions. However, because of network e⁄ects and consumer
inertia, the establishment of new payment networks is hard. Hence, the extent to which
these entrants will serve as e⁄ective competitors for the established networks is unclear,
particularly when faced with well-established incumbent networks.
5.3 One size does not ￿t all
Di⁄erent policy choices have been made by policymakers regarding the payment card
industry over the last two decades. For example, in Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom, the NSR has been abolished, while in many countries the NSR
still prevail. In the U.S. this rule has been abolished by MasterCard and Visa but not
by American Express, which opposes the DOJ on this issue. The policy dichotomy does
not imply that only one group of nations has made an accurate analysis. In fact, reality
may ￿t Figure 3 with countries that abolished the NSR lying on area A, while countries
that protect the NSR by law, or simply allow networks to impose the NSR on contracts,
lying on area B. According to our model, when deciding the NSR adoption or refusal,
policymakers should take into account (i) the degree of competition among merchants
(￿ of the model) that characterizes the economy, and, (ii) the weight of the network
externality that merchants exert over cardholders relatively to consumer sensitiveness
towards membership fees. Di⁄erent nations likely have di⁄erent estimates of the two
determinants for the NSR refusal or adoption. Hence, our model is compatible with the
dichotomy on policy choice. In general, to set a uniform payment card policy worldwide
would not serve the social interest of each nation or region.
Both the elimination of restrictions on di⁄erential pricing and laissez faire policies
have advantages and drawbacks; after arguing in favor of policy segmentation by coun-
try, we further argue in favor of policy customization by market. That is, policymakers32
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should take into account merchants￿market power, choosing the best policy on a market-
by-market basis instead of uniformly regulating all markets. More speci￿cally, when the
network e⁄ect of merchants on cardholders is su¢ ciently weak (condition of NSR prof-
itability for networks) then policymakers should concentrate their e⁄orts on implementing
the NSR only on less competitive markets where merchants do not pass-through the mar-
ginal cost of card usage to cardholders (see Remark 2). Just like di⁄erent countries adopt
di⁄erent policies, we propose the extension of this rationale to the industry level. When
one policy does not ￿t all markets, then virtue lies in choosing the right policy that best
suits each individual industry.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we built a three-party model with consumers, merchants and electronic
payment networks. We extend the literature on electronic payment networks that sheds
light on the e⁄ects of the No-Surcharge Rule on networks￿pricing, pro￿ts and social wel-
fare. We debate some possible policy interventions and claim that card payments should
be regulated on a market-by-market basis. For the sake of simplicity, our theoretical
model does not distinguish among di⁄erent types of payment card (debit, credit, prepaid)
and may fail to capture important real-world features such as the role of credit that would
probably in￿ uence the model￿ s results.
Our ￿rst set of results relates to the seminal work of R&T (2003) extending its analysis
to include the e⁄ect of a variation on network size. We show that the existence of net-
work e⁄ects adds a speci￿c cross elasticity term to the formula for optimal EPN pricing.
We derive a series of results based on elasticities showing that (i) the platform￿ s pro￿t
maximization problem can be decomposed in two steps: (1) setting the total fee level,
and (2) the relative fees, (ii) consumers demand for payment services becomes less elastic
with respect to merchant fee under the NSR, and (iii) the absence of surcharge variations
amongst EPNs holds back network competition resulting in higher total fee levels.
In a second set of results, we show ￿rst that the NSR rebalances the relative fees in
favor to cardholders and against the merchants. We also investigate under which circum-
stances the NSR is a pro￿table strategy for EPNs. We ￿nd that the NSR increases EPNs￿
pro￿ts if and only if the cross-group externality exerted by merchants on cardholders is
su¢ ciently weak. The NSR in￿ ates merchant fees decreasing the merchant demand for
EPNs, therefore if the cross-group network e⁄ect is strong, consumer demand and, by
implication, EPNs￿pro￿ts will both sharply decrease.
In the welfare analysis, we show that the NSR reduces the number of merchants
accepting card payments, increases the number of cardholders and raises the equilibrium
goods market price paid by cardholders. We investigate the surplus variations that the33
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